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During the past decades, global minerals and metals trade has expanded 
tremendously with emerging markets such as China and India playing a growing  
significant role. Countries have become more specialized in producing certain 
minerals and metals and more reliant on other raw materials from foreign resources. 
As the global market for commodities grew tighter, the prices for raw materials and 
their volatility rocketed. Export restrictions 1  on minerals and metals have since 
become increasingly frequent2. The phenomenon consists bursts of escalating but 
relatively short-lived interventions, medium-to-long-term fiscal adjustments as well as 
creeping protectionism. Export restrictions are broadly applied across almost all 
minerals and metals to various extents largely by emerging and developing countries 
and with different rationales3. According to OECD Inventory of Restrictions on Trade 
in Raw Materials4 (hereafter called OECD Inventory) (OECD, 2014), 57 out of 72 
countries with available data have imposed at least one export restriction on minerals 
and metals or their wastes and scraps during the period 2009 to 2012. There was a 
drastic surge of export restrictions usage since about a decade ago – over 50 
percent of the restrictions effective in 2012 were enacted after 2009 and 466 out of 
over 2000 measures were introduced in 2012 itself. The export restrictions have, to 
various extents, led to global supply shortages and increased volatilities in 
commodity prices 5 . Accusations that these restrictions have contributed to the 
frictions and the public trade disputes among governments and their trading partners 
are not uncommonly seen. In addition, there are further confusion and uncertainty 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
1!Appendix A provides a more comprehensive list of export restriction measures and their definitions.!
2!Appendix B provides a list of countries that impose export restrictions. 
3!The evolution of use of export restrictions saw a pattern shift from an objective which was largely 
revenue generation centric and to a lesser extent fulfilling domestic obligations (prior to 19th century) to 
an increasingly diversified objectives of governments besides revenue generation, mainly: 1) to 
indirectly subsidize downstream industries; 2) to continue generating government revenue; 3) to use 
natural resources more sustainably; 4) to monitor export activities and combat illegal; 5) to intervene 
flows of foreign capital and the exchange rate setting mechanism (21st Century) (Goode et al.,1966; 
Fung and Korinek, 2014). 
4 OECD Inventory is a database established since 2009 to provide systematic track of export restrictions 
supported by surveys of a great number of counties and raw materials, covering both industrial raw 
materials and primary agricultural and food commodities. The inventory tracks restrictive trade 
measures for over 80 industrial raw materials in a various forms: primary and semi-refined/ processed 
state or in waste and scrap form. It records data for 72 countries (EU as a single region) and for the 
entire period from 2009 to 2012. The focus of this thesis is on the use of data related to minerals and 
metals trade and will utilize this database as a starting point for sampling. 
5!This  is partially due to the fact that the minerals production is high-concentrated and in a short-term 
some of the minerals cannot be substituted in industrial production.!
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caused by these restrictive policies in the global marketplace due to the fact that 
most of the governments of mineral and metal exporting countries, if not all, 
announce such policies without advance notice. These could lead to devastating 
situations for some, be it a country that relies heavily on certain strategic raw 
materials, a mining company with concentrated productions or a commodity trader 
with geographically concentrated supply, not only because of the adversely affected 
access to raw materials but also because of the short turnaround time to adjust their 
position. As a result, with the prospect of more restrictive export policies, 
governments of minerals and metals importing countries, multinational mining 
companies and global commodity traders have begun to incorporate in their business 
strategies the risk of potential inaccessibility to raw materials. However, there seem 
to be rare, if not at all, researches into the risk management arena with regard to the 
export restrictions. Therefore, to establish a groundbreaking risk management tool of 
such kind suddenly becomes an interesting topic to explore. 
This thesis pioneers into the risk management arena from the perspective of the 
stakeholders of the export restrictions other than the restriction-imposing country. It 
sets out to establish a useful statistical model to predict whether a given country is 
going to implement new export restriction policies or tighten the existing policies for a 
particular type of minerals or metals6 one year before these measures take place. 
This model serves as an alert to potential adverse policy changes and allows 
respective stakeholders of export restrictions to prepare their government policies or 
business strategies with the one-year lead-time under the proposed model in this 
thesis. Consequently, the global market will perform more effectively and more 
efficiently when decisions of traders and end users are based on rational evaluations 
of potential costs, risks and market opportunities. Furthermore, by developing the 
statistical model, the thesis also sheds some lights into the influence of each variable 
on the export restriction policymaking. From the research perspective, this thesis 
also enriches the literature of export restrictions by bringing in some new variables 
that seem to have never been statistically tested.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the linear multiple 
discriminant analysis (LMDA) and its usefulness in developing the export restriction 
policy prediction model. The discriminant model is developed in Section 3, where an 
initial sample of seventy incidents with a combination of different countries and 
different minerals or metals is used to establish a function which best discriminates 
                                                 
6 The scope of the minerals and metals covered under this study incorporates aluminum, antimony, 
chromium, cobalt, copper, gold, iron, lead, lithium, nickel, palladium, platinum, rare-earths, tin, titanium, 
tungsten, zinc. Both primary and secondary (refined metals) are covered. 
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between incidents in two mutually exclusive groups: policy-tightening incidents and 
non-policy-tightening incidents. Section 4 reviews empirical results obtained from the 
initial sample and utilizes a variety of techniques to examine the reliability of the 
model for its predicting power. In Section 5 the model’s adaptability to practical 
decision situations and its potential benefits in a variety of situations are suggested. 
A case study on Indonesia’s recent export ban on raw materials export is also 
exemplified in this section. The final section summarizes the findings and 
conclusions of the study, and proposes some further areas for research.  
2. MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
Multiple discriminant analysis 7  (MDA) is a statistical tool, which undertakes to 
investigate the most significant differences between groups on the basis of the 
attributes of the cases and to classify an observation into one of several priori 
groupings dependent on the observation’s individual attributes. It is used primarily to 
classify and/or make predictions in problems where the dependent variable appears 
in qualitative form, e.g. male or female, tightening of export restrictions or not 
tightening export restrictions. Since the development of MDA by two different 
researchers, Fisher 8  (1936) and Mahalanobis 9  (1936), who started with different 
approaches to the problem of discriminating groups, MDA has been applied in a 
variety of fields such as biological and behavioral sciences (Cohran, 1964), finance 
studies10 and face recognition (Etemad and Chellappa, 1997). Unlike multiple logistic 
regression11, MDA does not require its dependent variable to be dichotomous. MDA 
appears in both linear and quadratic forms. Mathematically, linear multiple 
discriminant analysis (LMDA) is a simplified version of quadratic multiple discriminant 
analysis (QMDA). For this thesis, whenever MDA is mentioned, it refers to LMDA. 
The MDA technique starts with establishing explicit group classifications. The original 
groups can be two or more. Once groups are established, data are collected for the 
                                                 
7 Discriminant (Function) Analysis (DA) undertakes the same task as multiple linear regressions by 
predicting an outcome. However, multiple linear regression is limited to cases where the dependent 
variable on the Y axis is an interval variable so that the combination of predictors will, through the 
regression equation, produce estimated mean population numerical Y values for given values of 
weighted combinations of X values (Agresti, 1996). DA, on the other hand, can be applied to solve this 
problem by allowing dependent variable be a categorical variable.  
8 Maximal separation is determined from an eigen analysis of W-1B, where B is the between-group sum-
of-squares and cross-products (SSCP) matrix, and W is the within-group SSCP matrix. Fisher (1936) 
attempts to maximize the W-1B to achieve optimal discrimination between groups. This thesis is based 
on the Fisher’s approach. 
9 For Mahalanobis (1936), an observation with unknown group membership is classified as belonging to 
the group with smallest Mahalanobis distance between the observation and group mean. 
10 Examples of applications of MDA in finance include:  credit evaluation (Durand, 1941), classification 
of firms with high and low price earnings ratios  (Walter, 1959), investment classification (Smith, 1965) 
and bankruptcy prediction (Altman, 1968). 
11 Logistic regression is a similar statistical tool to DA, as it also explains a categorical variable by the 
values of continuous independent variables. However, it only allows its dependent variable to represent 
two categories. 
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items in the groups. MDA then attempts to derive a linear combination of these 
attributes which best discriminates between the groups: 




where   𝑊 = Discriminate function 
𝑉 = Unstandardized discriminant coefficient 
𝑋 = Independent variables 
𝑎 = A constant 
𝑖 = Number of predictor variables 
The resulting function optimizes coefficients V’s to maximize the distance between 
the means of the dependent variable. Large weights (i.e. bigger absolute value of 
V’s) are usually associated with good predictors. Once discriminant function(s) is 
generated, according to the scores calculated for the new cases, one can predict 
which group each case belongs to. The number of discriminant functions is one less 
the number of groups. There is only one function for the basic two-group discriminant 
analysis. 
After careful consideration over the nature of the problem this thesis attempts to 
resolve, MDA is selected as the most appropriate statistical tool to undertake this 
task. The MDA technique considers an entire profile of attributes common to the 
relevant countries and minerals or metals, as well as the interaction of these 
properties simultaneously, giving it an edge over other univariate statistical analyses. 
Another advantage of MDA is the reduction of the dimensionality, i.e. from the 
number of different independent variables to g-1 dimension(s), where g equals to the 
number of original a priori groups. This thesis is concerned with two groups, 
consisting of export restrictions tightening incidents and export restrictions not 
tightening incidents. Thus, the analysis is transformed to the simplest form: one 
dimension.   
A couple of assumptions are needed for the MDA technique. First of all, the 
observations should be a random sample and each predictor variable is normally 
distributed. Secondly, the covariance matrices should be the same (or very similar) 
for all groups. These barriers are considered quite high. Nevertheless, past 
literatures show, in spite of the shortcomings, MDA methods are still widely used 
among academic researches and business practices. However, there is always a 
potential problem of high degree of correlation or collinearity among variables when 
assessing a country’s tendency on tightening its export restrictions on a particular 
mineral or metal using a comprehensive list of parameters. For Altman (1968), 
although this aspect necessitates careful selection of the predictive variables, it also 
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has the advantage of yielding a model with a relatively small number of selected 
measurements that will potentially convey a great deal of information. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ERPP MODEL 
3.1. Sample Selection 
The initial sample is composed of seventy observations, half of which relates to a 
country tightening export restrictions and the other half relates to a country not 
tightening export restrictions. It is generally held that the group sizes of the 
dependent should not be grossly different and should be at least five times the 
number of independent variables. In our case, the ERPP model is composed of 
thirteen independent variables, and the entire population of the training sample is 
more than five times of the number of the independent variables. OECD Inventory 
contains data for export restrictions from 2009 to 2012. The data for each year is 
summarized in Table 3.1. Year 2010 stands out immediately because it has a larger 
sample size, more (+) observations, more (+) countries and more countries that have 
both tightening of policies on some minerals or metals and non-tightening policies on 
the others. Meanwhile, it is not disadvantaged in the rest of the aspects. 








No. of  (-
) Obs 
No. of  (-
) Ctry  
(+) vs (-) 
Ctry 
2009 788 125 9 663 46 5 
2010 819 170 17 649 46 12 
2011 796 70 13 726 45 8 
2012 795 38 9 757 48 9 
Source: Author’s investigation. 
Therefore, 2010 is selected as the year that the training sample is built on. As the 
number of the countries that tightened their export restrictions is limited to only 
seventeen in that year, in order to achieve broader representativeness, all seventeen 
countries are covered under the initial sample. The selection of minerals or metals 
covered for each country is as follows: firstly, based on the existing records in the 
OECD Inventory, top-ranked minerals or metals in terms of total productions or total 
exports are selected; secondly, a filter is applied to all these domestically important 
observations to obtain those with relative importance in the global markets. It is 
                                                 
12 (1) (+) represents export restrictions tightening while (-) represents policy not tightening. (2) Each 
observation above corresponds to an observation in OECD Inventory on a HS6 level for every type of 
export restrictions. Thus the number of observations is inflated in the table because even when, for 
instance, six export restrictions are tightened during the year for one mineral or metal, it will be counted 
as one single entry into author’s database to represent a tightening of policy on one particular mineral or 
metal in one country during that year.  
(3) (+) vs (-) represents the number of countries who have both tightening of policies on some minerals 
or metals and non-tightening policies on the others. The more these types of countries, the more 
insightful a training sample can be constructed. 
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easily envisaged that some smaller countries have limited influence on the global 
markets, and thus will be filtered out from this process. Nevertheless, the top one or 
two minerals or metals are kept for smaller countries in the initial sample in order to 
maintain broader country coverage, increasing the model’s robustness13. Finally, a 
random selection is conducted among those countries that have quite a few 
internationally significant minerals or metals.  
A paired thirty-five observations are selected to formulate the second group in which 
the export restrictions were not tightened during 2010. The same sampling process 
as described above is applied for group two as well. The sampling for group two is 
less difficult compared with that for group one as there were many more countries 
that did not tighten its export restrictions on a mineral or metal than those that did. 
3.2. Choice of Variables 
The literatures on predictors of export restrictions policy change is very limited. 
Therefore, most of the variables used in the ERPP model are initiated in this thesis 
based on the potential relevancy to the study. A list of twenty-one potentially useful 
variables is compiled for the evaluation (see Appendix C). From the original list of 
variables, thirteen are selected as doing the best overall job together in the prediction 
of policy tightening. In order to reach the final profile of the ERPP model, the 
following aspects were considered by the author: 1) statistical significance of various 
alternative functions including determination of relative contributions of each 
independent variable; 2) inter-correlation between relevant variables; and 3) 
observation of the predictive accuracy of the various profiles. The final profile of 
variables includes: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 – Current indirect market power. This is measured by the significance of a 
country’s production volume of a mineral or metal to the world’s production volume of 
that mineral or metal. It is hypothesized that the larger the market power of global 
supply a country possesses, the more likely it is to strengthen the export restrictions.    
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 – The significance of a mineral or metal towards a country’s GDP. If a country’s 
economy is significantly contributed by the industry of a particular type of mineral or 
metal, the government tends to impose or tighten export policies, especially export 
taxes, on this mineral or metal to collect more revenues. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
the higher the contribution, the more likely the export restrictions will be tightened. 
Ideally, the mineral-based economic contribution shall be used. However, due to lack 
                                                 
13 By including observations related to smaller countries whose minerals and metals do not have most 
significant influence in the global market place, the discriminant functions generated under the ERPP 
model will hopefully become more versatile, thus can be applied for prediction of export restrictions 
policy change for new cases of smaller countries. 
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of data, the mining and quarrying industry data is used as a proxy to the economic 
contribution of a particular mineral or metal.  
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑣  – Growth of government revenue. This is measured by the change of a 
country’s government revenue from two-year before the year in concern to one-year 
before the year in concern. In our case, the government revenue of 2009 and 2008 
are compared. It is hypothesized that the more the government revenue increases, 
the less likely the government will tighten the export restrictions, especially export 
taxes, to collect revenue. On the other hand, if revenue decreases, a government is 
much more likely to increase taxes to compensate revenue loss in other areas. 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 – Strength of economy. This is measured by the growth of a country’s GDP from 
two-year before the year in concern to one-year before the year in concern. In our 
case, the country GDP of 2009 and 2008 are compared. It is hypothesized that if the 
economy becomes better, a government would have better revenue as well. 
Therefore, the higher the GDP ratio, the less likely the export restrictions are to be 
strengthened. 
𝐹𝑋 – Strength of local currency against dollars. This is measured by the change of a 
country’s FX (denominated as local currency per USD) from two-year before the year 
in concern to one-year before the year in concern. In our case, the FX of 2009 and 
2008 are compared.  The reason that USD is used as a currency benchmark is that 
most of the global commodities, including minerals and metals, are traded in USD. It 
is hypothesized that if the local currency of a country depreciates, the overall 
extracting and production costs become relatively low compared with other producing 
countries, ceteris paribus, while the USD-denominated world price for the mineral or 
metal does not change. This will encourage exports. Therefore, the government’s 
revenue collection target is easier to be achieved and consequently it is less likely to 
tighten the export restrictions. 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐 – Strength of downstream industry. This is represented by the ratio of the 
production volume of the processing industry over the production volume of both the 
upstream and downstream industries. A positive correlation is hypothesized to exit 
between the strength of downstream industry and the probability of stricter policy. In 
order to retain the minerals and their subsequent downstream smelting and refining 
domestically, governments tend to tighten the export policy. This can be evidenced 
by the measures in many countries where “protecting downstream industries” is used 
as an excuse for imposing or tightening export measures. As a result, the local 
downstream industries benefit from lower mineral prices compared with their 
international counterparts. 
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𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 – Potential indirect market power. This is modeled by the proportion of the 
world’s mineral deposit that a country has. The measurement of deposits is either by 
volume of raw materials or by volume of metal contents these raw materials contain, 
depending on different cases. The hypothesis of the relationship between this factor 
and the likelihood of tightening export restrictions is difficult to make—there is a 
tendency of reserve-rich countries to exert their potential market power to generate 
more revenue in some cases while in other cases the countries with a low reserve-to-
production ratio 14 might want to take their opportunities while reserves still last.  
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 – Level of privatization. This is measured by the share of the total production 
capacity for a mineral or metal in a country that private sector15 possesses. In a 
country that both private sector and state owned companies (SOEs) export raw 
materials, it is hypothesized that the higher the proportion of private sector, the more 
likely the government will impose stricter export policies. The underlying assumption 
is that levying heavier taxes in a scenario that SOEs export the majority of raw 
materials would not provide the government a significant amount of extra money 
because SOEs will ultimately remit the profits back to the state in a form of dividends. 
One caveat for the significance of 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 factor is that it is subject to the influence of 
royalties or mining taxes used by some governments. When a government collects 
revenue mainly through royalties or mining taxes, the level of privatization is 
expected to become insignificant toward the probability of tightening export restrictive 
measures.  
𝐸𝑥𝑝 – Current dynamic (direct) market power. This is measured by the significance of 
a country’s export of a mineral or metal to the world’s total export of that mineral or 
metal. The hypothesis on this variable is undetermined. A higher significance of a 
country’s export may lead to more likely tightening of export restrictions due to a 
government’s tendency to take advantage of its market power. On the other hand, it 
may well be the opposite situation. The high proportion of the supply to the global 
market may represent that a government has already generated enough revenue out 
of the existing export taxes and thus less willing to harm the exports by imposing 
stricter export policies. 
𝑆𝑚𝑢𝑔  – Extent of illegal activities in exporting minerals or metals. This is 
approximated by the value of the black market of a country as a proportion of the 
                                                 
14 A low reserve-to-production ratio can be associated with either reserve-rich countries or countries 
whose reserves are not among the top. Thus, it is not clear if a higher reserve will correlates with higher 
probability of stricter export policies. For instance, Guinea is one of the top producer of bauxite while it 
does not possess the largest reserves. Despite that the direction of influence is unclear, Reserve factor 
increases the accuracy of the ERPP model, which measures “collective” explanatory power of the 
independent variables. 
15 Private sector refers to local private businesses and multinational mining companies. 
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total value of the world’s black market due to lack of precise data on the subject. One 
of the popular arguments government put forward to impose or tighten the export 
restrictions is the loss of control over export activities and  revenue loss due to illegal 
exports. Thus, it is hypothesized that the higher the black market value of a country, 
the more likely the government will take stricter measures in the exports.  
𝐵𝑢𝑑  – Balance of budget of a government. This is measured by the ratio of 
government expenditure over government revenue with one-year lead time. This 
variable supplements 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑣 and provides additional information on how short of 
money the government is in attempting to fulfill its ambition. It is hypothesized that 
the more deficit the budget is, the more likely the government is going to tighten the 
export restrictions.  
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙o – Job market performance of a country. Economic success is not the only 
goal of a government. It is said that in the minerals and metals industry, the more 
downstream along the value chain the business is, the more labor-intensive it is. It is 
hypothesized that a higher unemployment rate would stimulate a government’s 
desire to improve the employment by protecting downstream industries, which 
consequently increases the likelihood of tightening export restrictions. 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 – Value of mineral or metal commodities. This is measured by the change of 
USD price of the material from two-year lead time before the year in concern to one-
year lead time. In our case, the commodity prices of 2009 and 2008 are compared. It 
is hypothesized that the higher the price of the commodity, the more likely 
governments will tighten the export restrictions as they also want to take a share out 
of this commodity boom together with its local mining industries. 
Table 3.2 Data Summary of Individual Variables 
Variable Obs  Mean   Std. Dev   Min   Max   F Ratio   P-Value   
Prod 70  12.948   20.274   -     97.929   0.014   0.907  
Econ 70  7.334   7.683   0.032   44.800   7.478   0.008  
Govrev 70  0.983   0.222   0.560   1.850   10.008   0.002  
GDP 70  1.013   0.149   0.740   1.850   5.143   0.027  
FX 70  2.901   15.177   0.970   128.068   1.005   0.320  
Struc 70  33.797   29.075   -     100.000   1.688   0.198  
Reserve 70  8.726   13.636   0.000   73.171   2.765   0.101  
Owner 70  73.743   38.019   -     100.000   0.947   0.334  
Exp 70  7.352   16.274   -     97.300   1.363   0.247  
Smug 70  3.251   6.178   0.020   34.530   0.650   0.423  
Bud 70  1.112   0.373   0.713   3.034   2.825   0.097  
Unemplo 70  10.639   13.640   0.600   80.000   0.930   0.338  
Price 70  0.862   0.242   0.461   1.299   0.196   0.659  
Source: Author’s investigation. 
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F-test is used to examine the individual discriminating ability of the variables. This 
test relates the difference between the average values of the predictor in each group 
to the variability of values of the predictor within each group. Results are summarized 
in Table 3.2 above. It is observed that only Econ, Govrev, GDP and Bud are 
significant at a relatively low significance level, indicating significant differences in 
these variables between groups. The rest of the variables do not seem to have a 
significant discriminating power at 10 percent significance level. However, the inter-
correlations between these non-significant variables display some negative 
correlations (shown in Appendix D), which are considered good by the literature to 
add extra information to the discriminant function (Cochran, 1964). Indeed, as the 
empirical test will show, these individually not very significant variables contribute 
significantly to the classification collectively.  








 Prod   1.47  13 
 Govrev   0.95  1 
 GDP   0.92  3 
 Econ   0.87  2 
 FX   0.76  8 
 Reserve   0.74  5 
 Exp   0.59  7 
 Bud   0.54  4 
 Struc   0.49  6 
 Unemplo   0.39  10 
 Smug   0.33  11 
 Owner   0.30  9 
 Price   0.17  12 
Source: Author’s investigation. 
Because the actual variable measurement units are not all comparable to each other, 
the relative contribution of each variable is different than the coefficient to be 
generated in the ERPP model. The relevant statistic is observed as a scaled vector, 
which is computed by multiplying corresponding elements by the square roots of the 
diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix. For instance, the square root of 
the appropriate variance-covariance figure (standard deviation) for Prod is 
approximately 20.274 (see Table 3.2) and when multiplied by the variable’s 
                                                 
16 The resulting scaled vector is taken from the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients. 
These coefficients indicate the relative importance and relationship between the discriminating variables 
and the discriminant functions. The difference from the manual calculations is due to rounding. 
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coefficient 0.072 yields a scaled vector of about 1.46. This standardization is applied 
to all the variables and the results are summarized in Table 3.3 with descending 
order. 
Section 2 mentions that collinearity or multi-collinearity is a potential issue that would 
deteriorate the predictability of the MDA technique. According to Neos and Mevik 
(2001), collinearity in a discriminant function will lead to instability of eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors, which may affect the sign of resulting discriminant function coefficients 
and the relative contribution of each independent variable. The noises created may 
reduce the predictive power of the model for future applications. After reviewing 
correlations between every two independent variables, author identified two pairs of 
correlation that might cause muilti-collinearity, i.e. GDP-Govrev and Reserve-Prod, 
both of which have a correlation above 0.75. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 
therefore applied to all the variables to verify the above suspicion. There are two 
variables that have a VIF value greater than 10, which is the threshold that merits 
further examinations or/and adjustments. Govrev, with a VIF value of 14.03, is one of 
the two variables. The other one is GDP, which is associated with a VIF value of 
12.38.  
To assess whether this collinearity will harm the validity of the model, the following 
aspects have been carefully studied: 1) whether multi-collinearity fundamentally 
changes the sign of some coefficients; 2) whether multi-collinearity changes the 
relative contribution of each variable; 3) whether multi-collineraity reduces 
classification accuracy for the initial dataset; and finally 4) whether multi-collinearity 
adversely affected the predictability of the ERPP model when applying to new 
cases17. It is found that the collinearity does not change the sign of any coefficients in 
our case. However, it changes the ranking order of relative contribution per variable. 
For example, either GDP or Govrev is of relative low contribution to the predictability, 
ranking the tenth in the model without variable Govrev and the eleventh in the model 
without variable GDP respectively. However, the ERPP model, which is identified 
with collinearity, ranks Govrev and GDP at the top (see Table 3.3). Another major 
difference between the ERPP model and the two testing models is the relative 
contribution of Bud. In the testing models, Bud is ranked second and fourth while in 
the ERPP model it is ranked only eighth. It is argued that the ERPP model, 
nevertheless, is still superior model as it performs better in both step three and step 
                                                 
17 Three models, the ERPP model, the model without GDP variable and the model without Govrev 
variable, are tested following these four-step procedure. In the fourth step, all data are applied to a 
secondary dataset to assess their performance in predicting new cases. More details about the 
secondary dataset please refer to Section 4.3. 
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four, which are the main focus of this thesis—finding a useful prediction tool for 
export restrictions. 
3.3. The ERPP Model 
After numerous computer runs analyzing different variables combination, below 
presents the final discriminant function that best discriminates between groups.  
𝑊 = 0.072𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 − 0.118𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 4.556𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑣 − 6.373𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 0.05𝐹𝑋 + 0.017𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐 −
0.055𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 + 0.008𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 − 0.036𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 0.053𝑆𝑚𝑢𝑔 + 1.475𝐵𝑢𝑑 −
0.029𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜 + 0.701𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 0.413 ................................. (I) 
where 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 = [Country production of a material]/ [World production of that material] 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 = [GDP of the mining & quarrying industry in one country]*100/ [Country GDP] 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑣 = [Government revenue]/ {Government revenue} 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = [Country GDP]/ {Country GDP} 
𝐹𝑋 = [Equivalent country currency per USD]/ {Equivalent country currency per USD} 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐 = [Downstream production]*100/ ([Primary production]+ [Downstream production]) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 = [Country reserve of a mineral]*100/ [World reserve of that mineral] 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 = [Private sector production capacity]*100/ ([Private sector production capacity]+ [Public sector 
production capacity]) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 = [Country mineral or metal export]*100/ [World export of that mineral or metal] 
𝑆𝑚𝑢𝑔 = [Country black market value]/ [World black market value] 
𝐵𝑢𝑑 = [Government expenditure]/ [Government revenue] 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙o = [Country unemployment rate]*100 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = [Price of the material in USD]/ {Price of the material in USD} 
Notes: [] means that it is one-year-lead-time data taken from one-year before the year in concern; {} that 
it is two-year-lead-time data taken from two-year before the year in concern. 
The final model reveals the correlation between each independent variable and the 
decision a government makes regarding whether to tighten the export restrictions on 
a particular type of mineral or metal produced in its country. Reviewing the 
hypotheses made in Section 3.3 on each variable, all of them are as expected apart 
from those for Unemplo and Exp. For Unemplo, it goes the other way by indicating 
that the higher the unemployment rate, the less likely that government will impose 
stricter rules. A possible explanation could be that although mining industry is integral 
to a country’s economy, it is not the most significant in terms providing employment 
opportunities compared with other industries such as most labor-intensive services 
industries. On the other hand, for Exp, the model confirms that governments are 
more concerned about losing the existing export revenues than generating more 
revenues by taxing more. As discussed previously, due to the multi-collinearity 
between the Govrev and GDP factors, the relative contribution among variables are 
slightly distorted. Nevertheless, the signs and overall predictive power remains valid. 
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F-test is employed here to determine the overall discriminating power of the model. It 
calculates the ratio of sums-of-squares between groups to the sums-of-squares 
within groups. The equation is shown below. When the ratio is maximized, it 
effectively separates apart the group means of G groups to the maximum while 
simultaneously pulling individual points within the group together to the best of its 
ability.  
𝐹 =
∑ 𝑁𝑔(𝜇𝑔 − 𝜇)2𝐺𝑔=1
∑ ∑ (𝑖𝑝𝑔 − 𝜇𝑔)2𝑁𝑔𝑝=1𝐺𝑔=1
 
where 
𝐺 = Number of groups 
𝑔 = Group g, g = 1 … G 
𝑁𝑔 = Number of observations in group g 
𝑖𝑝𝑔 = Observation p in group g, p = 1 … 𝑁𝑔 (in this case the W-score as per equation (I)) 
𝜇𝑔 = Group mean 
𝜇 = Overall sample mean 
The group means for the group with tightening export restrictions and the group 
without tightening export restrictions are 0.7703 and -0.7732 respectively. The F-ratio 
for the test stands at 2.6412 with a p-value of 0.006, meaning that a priori groups are 
significantly different at 1% significance level and thus the null hypothesis that the 
observations come from the same population is rejected.  
Therefore, new cases can be assigned to one of the two groups once their W-scores 
are calculated. The idea is to compare the profiles of the new cases against those of 
the existing two mutually exclusive groups and assign them to the group they 
resemble more closely. In our case, the cutoff point for the classification is the mean 
of the two group means of W-scores, -0.0015. In another word, a new case with a 
calculated W-score greater than -0.0015 will be assigned to export restrictions 
tightening group while a new case with a W-score less than -0.0015 will be 
categorized into the group without stricter export restrictions. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Initial Sample 
The initial sample of thirty-five observations in each of the two groups is classified in 
accordance to the classification rule generated under ERPP model. A summary of 
the classification is presented under the below re-substitution table, Table 4.1. The 
word re-substitution is used because the same observations that built the model are 
being classified by the model. As a result, a high accuracy rate is expected. In the 
table, the classification is displayed with a priori groupings on the side while the 
predicted groupings are at the top. The misclassification of a (+) group into (-) group 
 14 
represents the Type I error and the misclassification of a (-) group into (+) group 
represents the Type II error. Correct percentages shown in the table are considered 
analogies to the coefficient of determination (R2) in regression analysis, which 
measures the explanatory power of an independent variable in percentage over the 
total variation of the dependent variable. 
Indeed, an overall high accuracy rate of classification at 86 percent is achieved. Type 
I error is extremely low, at only 6 percent, while Type II error is far bigger, at 23 
percent. This means that if the ERPP model indicates that in a new case, the 
government is not going to tighten its export restrictions on a mineral or metal, it is 
probably right; on the other hand, if the ERPP model suggests that in a new case, 
the government is going to tighten its export restrictions on a mineral or metal, it is 
more likely right than wrong. It is noted that this classification with initial sample is 
embedded with an upward bias and should be further validated using various 
techniques. 
Table 4.1 Re-substitution Classification Summary18 
 
Predicted 
  Actual (+) (-) Total 
    (+) 33 2 35 
Type I 0.94 0.06 1.00 
 
Correct Error 
 (-) 8 27 35 
Type II 0.23 0.77 1.00 
 
Error Correct 
 Total 41 29 70 
 
0.59 0.41 1.00 
Priors 0.50 0.50 1.00 
Source: Author’s investigation. 
4.2. Potential Bias And Validation Techniques 
According to Altman (1968), the upward bias is caused by 1) sampling errors in the 
initial sample; and 2) search bias when reducing the initial twenty-one potential 
variables to the current thirteen. He maintains that “the probability of bias due to 
intensive searching is inherent in any empirical studies”. To assess the bias, the 
author implements the leave-one-out (LOO) cross validation method, which provides 
a more realistic assessment of the classification success. The idea of the leave-one-
out cross validation (LOOCV) is to use a subset of the initial sample, sixty-nine in our 
case, as the training sample to formulate a discriminant function and predict the 
classification of the remaining one observation. The iterative process is run seventy 
                                                 
18 (+) represents export restrictions tightening while (-) represents policy not tightening. 
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times over every single observation by the computer to assess the accuracy of the 
classifications. The graphical illustration of the LOOCV process is presented in 
Figure 4.1 and the result of LOOCV is shown below in Table 4.2. A 70 percent 
overall accuracy is achieved after considering the search bias present in the initial 
sample, down quite a significant 16 percent. However, it does not invalidate the 
ERPP model as a useful tool in predicting export restriction policy change. 
Table 4.2 Leave-one-out (LOO) Classification Summary19 
  Predicted       
Actual (+) (-) Unclassified Total 
  
    (+)  24   10   1   35  
Type I  0.69   0.29   0.03   1.00  
   Correct   Error  
  (-)  10   25   -     35  
Type II  0.29   0.71   -     1.00  
   Error   Correct  
  Total  34   35   1   70  
   0.49   0.50   0.01   1.00  
Priors  0.50   0.50  
 
 1.00  
Source: Author’s investigation. 
4.3. Secondary Sample 
To further assess the predictive power of the ERPP model, a secondary sample 
consisting of ten exporting restriction tightening observations and ten exporting 
restriction non-tightening observations is prepared based on the data of year of 2012 
in OECD Inventory (2014) (see Appendix H). The summary of classification result is 
presented in Table 4.3 below.  
It is very encouraging that for the secondary dataset the Type I error is as low as 10 
percent. Normally, higher error percentage is expected for new cases. Type II error, 
nonetheless, rockets to 50 percent, meaning half of the export policy tightening 
predictions are not correct, i.e. the ERPP model overestimates the probability of 
tightening in general. Regardless, the overall accuracy is 70 percent, which is pretty 
                                                 







2) There is one observation that is not classified in this LOOCV process due to a tie in classification. 
This is also a great illustration of data sensitivity of the discriminant analysis. Imagine that the data of 
one of the relatively more significant independent variable changes, the accuracy rate will be affected 
immediately. To be conservative, this unclassified observation is deemed as false classification in 
calculating the accuracy rate. 
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consistent with the LOOCV result, suggesting that ERPP model is still a good tool to 
have in predicting policy change. 
Table 4.3 Secondary Dataset Classification Summary 
  Predicted     
Actual (+) (-) Total 
  
   (+)  9   1   10  
Type I  0.90   0.10   1.00  
   Correct   Error  
 (-)  5   5   10  
Type II  0.50   0.50   1.00  
   Error   Correct  
 Total  14   6   20  
   0.70   0.30   1.00  
Priors  0.50   0.50   1.00  
Source: Author’s investigation. 
5. APPLICATIONS 
5.1. Practical Suggestions of ERPP Model 
The ERPP model could be useful to six different parties in today’s global minerals 
and metals trade business, namely the raw materials importing countries, mining 
MNCs, global commodity traders, shipping lines and ship owners, mineral or metal 
exporting countries other than the one(s) tightening the export restrictions, and  
investment/ financial analysts.  
For raw material importing countries, there is a necessity to securely source 
commodities that have strategic industrial and military value to their respective 
industry sectors from international markets. ERPP model allows them to keep a good 
monitor over their trading partners to assess the foreign supply risks and reduce 
supply chain vulnerabilities. Should there be any indication that a major trading 
partner is likely to strengthen its policy on a particular material, the government of the 
importing country must have a contingent plan and do three things: 1)  importing as 
much as possible until enough from this trading partner before the implementation of 
the stricter policy; 2) developing new relationship with or enhancing existing 
relationship with other exporting countries (of the same material) to diversify supplies 
while importing more tonnages from them; 3) investing into countries with less 
likelihood of tightening policies in the long-term to secure more resources. 
For global commodity traders, in terms of securing supplies to fulfill their short 
positions, they work similarly as raw material importing countries. Meanwhile, ERPP 
model provides insights into potential change in fundamentals of supply and demand 
on certain materials by assessing the export policies of some major exporting 
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countries. If there is indication that the market is getting tighter on certain materials 
due to the potential policy change, then traders can increase their long position and 
store the materials in warehouse and sell at a higher price later on. In this sense, 
ERPP is not only a risk management tool, but to some extent, an opportunity 
identifier. 
For global mining companies, ERPP model is a good tool to assess the political risk 
when making new investments. Among the equally attractive mining projects, they 
might want to select the one with less likelihood of stricter export policies unless they 
are sure that the final products after extracting and processing are not going to suffer 
from such restrictions. In addition, for the existing projects, by assessing the hosting 
countries’ likelihood to tighten export policies, these MNCs can adjust their business 
plans accordingly to increase production from mine sites in countries without stricter 
export policies to fulfill the delivery obligations 20 . In the business plan, mining 
companies can also schedule shipments better to avoid demurrages due to unable to 
or short ship exporting materials; they can also study the probability of domestic 
downstream business if the primary production cannot be or is hard to be exported.  
For the ship owners and shipping lines, ERPP model indicates to them a potential 
loss of opportunity. Regardless of a country tightening or banning its export on 
certain minerals or metals, by basic economics, the quantity of the materials out of 
that country drops. The size of the drop depends on the elasticity of the supply. If this 
country is of great significance by supplying that material into the global market, 
shipping lines or ship owners will find themselves operating on a less exciting route, 
making them earn much less comparing to another route, for example, the one from 
another major country that supplies similar material to the consuming markets. 
Nonetheless, with accurate prediction, they could well avoid this from happening. 
For other exporting countries that supply similar materials as those who potentially 
will impose tighter export restrictions, the companies and government of that 
exporting country can carefully study the best actions to take to increase their 
welfare, for example, increasing the production to obtain bigger market share if the 
demand elasticity is low. It might prepare the local government better in terms of 
attracting long-term investment into the country’s mining sector.  
For investment/ financial analysts, ERPP model can be helpful in assessing the risks 
that a mining sector company is facing and thus affecting the evaluation of that 
company. If the stocks of the mining company is floated, investors could short sale 
                                                 
20 In case of export taxes increase, the delivery obligation will adversely impact companies’ profits. 
However, in case of export ban, the incident is normally regarded as a force majeure event thus the 
mining countries can walk away or deliver the quantities later on when the problems are resolved. 
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the stocks and buy back later to pocket some profits given that the tightening of 
policies will indeed happen. On the other hand, if one mineral or metal from one 
country is predicted to be affected by the tightening policies, investors could 
potentially invest into the stocks of companies producing such mineral or metal in a 
substituting country in anticipation that, when the market gets tighter, the stocks will 
become bullish. 
Although the ERPP model is generated from a small sample featuring on certain 
countries, certain minerals and metals, the potential usefulness is of great interest to 
the abovementioned parties. It is simple and low cost compared with other possible 
approaches. However, this thesis does not claim that the risk management decision 
with regards to stricter export policies should rely solely on this method. Rather 
contrarily, it should serve complementarily to the existing risk management 
mechanisms. Below a case study on Indonesia in 2014 is presented to spot some 
usefulness of the ERPP model in a real situation. 
5.2. Case Study: Indonesia in 2014 
5.2.1. A Brief Overview of Indonesia’s Mining Industry  
Indonesia is among the top ten countries in the world for proven reserves of copper, 
nickel, tin, bauxite and gold. It accounts for 29-30 percent of global nickel supply, 9-
10 percent of aluminum and three percent of copper (Rusmana and Chatterjee, 
2014; Sanderson and Hume, 2014). Driven by historically high commodity prices and 
surging production, Indonesia’s total mineral export value rocketed from USD 3 
billion to USD 11.2 billion during the period 2001-2013 (World Bank, 2014).  
On 11 January 2014, the Indonesian government enacted a ban on unprocessed 
mineral exports after the postponement from 2012 when the regulation was initially 
issued. This regulation dates back to 2009 when the Mining Law established the 
policy of adding value in the mineral sector through domestic processing (World 
Bank, 2014). However, in the last minute, the government revised its decision by 
exempting certain semi-processed concentrates, including copper, iron ore, 
manganese, lead, zinc and ilmenite, and imposing an unexpected export tax on them 
instead21 (ICTSD, 2014).  
Immediately after the levy of export restrictions, the global market witnessed that 
nickel price soared over 50 percent to a two-year high of USD 22,000 per tonne 
between January and mid-May 2014 and since then it has retreated (Sanderson and 
Hume, 2014). The market power Indonesian nickel has on the global market is said 
to be the main drive. MNCs such as Freeport McMoRan Inc. and Newmont Mining 
                                                 
21 The scheme of this extra export duty is summarized in Appendix G. 
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Corp., which together produce 97 percent of Indonesia’s copper, stopped capital 
expenditure into their assets and halted their copper and gold mine productions once 
the storage facilities were full (Vella, 2014). Stricter export policies in 2014 have led 
to a 25 percent and 40 percent drop in copper production of Freeport’s and 
Newmont’s Indonesian subsidiaries respectively (Freeport Annual Report 2014; 
Newmont Annual Report 2014). Country wise, China was the biggest victim of 
Indonesia’s export ban on raw materials, especially for nickel concentrates and 
bauxite. In 2013, 68 percent of the bauxite and 60 percent of the nickel ores China 
imported came from Indonesia (Maverick, 2014; Berry, 2014).  
5.2.2. Using ERPP Model To Predict Adverse Policy Change 
By plugging in the necessary data (i.e. 2012 and 2013 data) required for the ERPP 
model, we calculate W-scores for Indonesian unprocessed nickel, bauxite and 
unprocessed copper and reach 0.4514, 0.1216 and 0.7359 respectively.  According 
to the classification rule, export policies on all these minerals are predicted to be 
tightened during 2014, which was in line with reality. Given that the model could have 
predicted correctly in Indonesia’s case at the end of 2013, what can various parties 
do to strive for a better outcome? 
For raw material importing countries such as China, they could strategically build up 
stockpile of affected materials, invest and diversify into alternative supplying 
countries before the actual tightening of export policies. China  may not be the most 
appropriate example as it is known for stockpiling strategic commodities ranging from 
energy, minerals and metals to agricultural products even without a clear threat in the 
global market place. Nevertheless, ERPP model can still be useful in providing a 
tightening signal so that China can adjust the scale and scope of its stockpiling 
activities accordingly. For other raw material importing countries which do not have a 
habit of stockpiling, the ERPP model could be of a greater use.  
For global mining corporations such as Freeport and Newmont, should they knew 
that the copper concentrate exports would be tightened, they would have scheduled 
their shipments or delivery plans more carefully to avoid big sum of demurrage costs. 
The productions of both companies decreased in 2014 compared with those in 2013. 
Admittedly this is partially due to the sluggish copper price in 2014, if a strategic plan 
was built well before the stricter policies, they might have produced more materials 
form some other assets.  
International commodity traders can also benefit from the ERPP model if they knew 
that they had to secure some alternative supplies from alternative countries—for  
example, copper from Chile, Peru, Zambia and Democratic Republic of Congo, nickel 
from Canada, the Philippines and Australia, bauxite from Guinea, Jamaica and 
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Australia. They can use ERPP model as one of the useful tools to assess the overall 
market outlook by examining the extent of tightening policies by other major 
exporting counties.  
Other raw materials exporting countries such as the Philippines and Australia, with 
advance notice from the ERPP model, could take advantage of Indonesia’s tighter 
export policies. It was a trade-off between selling the same or similar quantity of 
minerals at higher prices and selling more quantity (given that the production can be 
increased) at not so high prices. In the case of nickel ores or concentrates, Nickel 
Asia Corp., which accounts for about a third of Philippines’ nickel output reported that 
they could not take new orders as the demand from the market outstripped their 
capacity (Chen, 2014). If Nickel Asia Corp. knew in advance about the Indonesia’s 
potential export ban, they could have taken some measures to temporarily increase 
their production capacity if that was more profitable. 
For ship owners and shipping lines, with reliable forecast, they could have deployed 
their vessels on routes that were not affected by Indonesia’s export ban. According to 
Stackhouse (2014), Indonesia accounts for 60 percent of the global seaborne trade 
of bauxite and nickel. The first half of 2014 saw significant shocks to dry bulk 
shippers such as DryShips Inc. (DRYS), Diana Shipping Inc. (DSX), Navios Maritime 
Holdings Inc. (NM) and Safe Bulkers Inc. (SB) (Mao, 2014). 
Investors and financial analysts, with careful considerations, could have short sold 
Freeport McMoRan Inc. (FCX) close to the end of 2013 at a recent peak of USD 
37.68 per share and buy back later on when price drop (Yahoo Finance, 2014). The 
trough before the stock price resumed was USD 30.64 per share (ibid). However, the 
ERPP model only provides some insight into a single aspect of the stock thus should 
never be considered as a perfect tool to making trading or investment decisions. If for 
the same reason as FCX, one shorted Newmont Mining Corp. (NEM), he would have 
lost some money during the same period. Other reported opportunities were: PT Vale 
Indonesia and PT Aneka Tambang, which mine nickel and have some processing 
facilities in Indonesia, climbed 5.4 percent and 1 percent on 13 January, two days 
after the official announcement; on the same date, in Sydney trading, Alumina Ltd. 
jumped 3.6 percent on prospects for increased demand after the ban went into effect 
(Rusmana and Chatterjee, 2014).  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis pioneers into the export restriction policy prediction avenue by 
establishing an MDA model which encompasses a number of macro economic 
indicators as well as variables that are specific to global minerals and metals trade. 
The resulting ERPP model proves to be fairly successful in predicting the tightening 
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of export restrictions with accuracy rate of 86 percent and 70 percent for the initial 
sample and the secondary sample respectively. Several practical applications of the 
model, such as supply risk monitoring, investment appraisal and fundamental 
analysis are suggested. This study can potentially contribute to academic research, 
policymaking and global minerals and metals trading business.  
A couple of limitations of the study exist: 1) the ERPP model does not specify which 
export restriction is likely to be tightened; 2) the model is based on annual data, thus 
does not capture the variability during the year and consequently cannot pinpoint the 
exact time the export restrictions are to be tightened within the year; 3) the model 
focuses on the potential risks over export policies while does not indicate 
opportunities when restrictions are lessened; 4) country macro indicators tend to 
decrease the accuracy of the model when one would like to use the model to 
differentiate between tightening and non-tightening policy change on minerals or 
metals of the same country; 5) the lead time for the model is limited to one year; 6) 
not all forty commonly used minerals and metals22 are covered by the ERPP model; 
and 7) samples and data are limited due to lack of documentation and research and 
thus need estimations. The abovementioned limitations require further investigations 
in this field. Another area for future research could be to extend the methodologies of 
developing the ERPP model into predicting export restriction policy change for 
energy and agricultural commodities.   
  
                                                 
22 According to  NMA (2014), there are forty most commonly used minerals and metals. 
 22 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Agresti, A. (1996). An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis. John Wiley and 
Sons. 
 
Altman, E.I. (1968). Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis And The Prediction of 
Corporation Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, Vol.XXIII, No.4, September 1968; 
589-609. 
 
Berry, F. (2014), “Nickel Outlook Lifts as Indonesian Export Ban Looms Over China”, 
Reuters, 17 October 2014. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/nickel-indonesia-
idUSL6N0I73C320131017. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
British Geological Survey (2014), World Minerals Production 2008-2012, London. 
 
British Geological Survey (2015), World Minerals Production 2009-2013, London. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2014). The World Factbook.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Chen, X. (2014), “China’s Nickel Imports Show the Gravity of Indonesia’s Export 





shippers. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Cochran, W. G. (1964), “On the Performance of the Linear Discriminant 
Function,”Technometrics, vol. 6, May 1964, pp. 179–190. 
 
Durand, D. D. (1941), Risk Elements in Consumer Installment Financing, Studies in 
Consumer Installment Financing (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1941), pp. 105–142.  
 
Elgin and Oztunail (2012). “Shadow economies all around the world: Model-based 
estimates”, VOX. 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/shadow-economies-around-world-model-based-
estimates. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Etemad, K. and Chellappa, R. (1997). Discriminant Analysis for Recognition of 
Human Face Images. Optical Society of America. Vol. 14, No. 8, August 1997; 1724-
1733. 
 
Fisher, R. A. (1936). The use of multiple measurements in taxonomic problems. 
Annals of Eugenics 7: 179–188. 
 
Fung, K. C. and Korinek, J. (2014), Economics of Export Restrictions as Applied to 
Industrial Raw Materials, Export Restrictions in Raw Materials Trade: Facts, fallacies 
and better practices. OECD, 2014. 
 
Freeport Annual Report 2014.  
 23 
http://investors.fcx.com/investor-center/financial-information/annual-reports-and-
proxy/default.aspx. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Goode, R., George E.L., and P. D. Ojha (1966), “Role of Export Taxes in Developing 
Countries.” Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund 13 (3) (November 1): 453–
503. 
 
Havoscope (2014). Havocscope Country Risk Ranking. 
http://www.havocscope.com/country-profile/. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) (2014). 
“Indonesia Enacts Mineral Export Ban”, Bridges, Vol. 8, No.1, 16 January 2014. 
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/indonesia-enacts-mineral-export-
ban. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014). IMF Primary Commodity Prices. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Mahalanobis, P. C. (1936). On the generalized distance in statistics. National 
Institute of Science of India 12: 49–55. 
 
Maverick, T. (2014), “Indonesia’s Move Can Send Aluminum Skyrocketing”, Wall 
Street Daily, 29 May 2014. 
http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2014/05/29/indonesias-move-can-send-aluminum-
skyrocketing/. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
National Mining Association, US (NMA) (2014). “40 Common Minerals and Their 




Newmont Annual Report 2014.  
http://www.newmont.com/investor-relations/financial-reports/annual-
reports/default.aspx. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
OECD (2014), Inventory of Restrictions on Exports of Raw Materials. 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/ntm/name,227284,en.htm. As of 14 June 2014. 
 
Rusmana, Y., Chatterjee, Neil. (2014), “Indonesia Bans Ore Exports in Push for 
Metal Smelting”, Bloomberg, 13 January 2014. 
 
Sanderson, H., Hume, N. (2014). “Nickel Gains after Indonesia Reaffirms Ore Export 
Ban”, Financial Times, 19 November 2014. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08b57272-7002-11e4-a0c4-
00144feabdc0.html#ixzz3YVNu8DLd. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Smith, K. V. (1965), Classification of Investment Securities Using MDA, Institute 
Paper #101 (Purdue University, Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, 
and Management Sciences, 1965). 
 
Stackhouse, L. (2014), “Lifting of Indonesian Exports Ban Good News for Dry Bulk 
Market”, Readmt, 6 August 2014. 
http://readmt.com/analysis/article/2014/08/06/lifting-of-indonesian-exports-ban-good-
news-for-dry-bulk-market/. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
 24 
UN Comtrade (2009). UN Comtrade Database. http://comtrade.un.org/. Accessed on 
7 May 2015. 
 
US Geological Survey (2009) represents a series of documents covering all countries 
and minerals or metals related to this thesis for the year 2009.  
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
US Geological Survey (2011) represents a series of documents covering all countries 
and minerals or metals related to this thesis for the year 2011. 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
US Geological Survey (2013) represents a series of documents covering all countries 
and minerals or metals related to this thesis for the year 2013. 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Vella, H. (2014), “The Fall-out from Indonesia’s Raw Mineral Ore Export Ban”, Mining 
Technology, 21 March. 
http://www.mining-technology.com/features/featurethe-fall-out-from-indonesias-raw-
mineral-ore-export-ban-4198626/. Accessed on 7 May 2013. 
 
Walter, J. E. (1959) “A Discriminant Function for Earnings Price Ratios of Large 
Industrial Corporations,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. XLI February 1959, 
pp. 44–52. 
 
World Bank (2014). “Some Recent Developments in Indonesia’s Economy”, 
Indonesia Economic Quarterly, March, pp.19-53. 
 
World Bank Database (2014).  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. Accessed on 7 May 2015. 
 
Yahoo Finance (2014). FCX and NEM stock prices. 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q;_ylt=AlGX1SHIlbEuGPVAqBQwp4Z.FJF4?uhb=uhb2&fr=




Appendix A: Definitions of Export Measures 
 
Export Restriction Definition* 
Export tax A tax collected on goods or commodities when they leave a customs territory. 
This tax can be set either on a per unit basis or an ad valorem (value) basis. 
Other terminology equivalent to export tax: export tariff, export duty, export 
levy, export charge. In some countries the term ‘cess’ is used. 
 
Fiscal tax on 
exports 
A tax not paid at the border, but that only applies to, or discriminates against, 
goods or commodities intended for export. An example is when the sales tax 
that a government charges is higher for goods or commodities intended for 
export than when these goods or commodities are offered for sale in the 
domestic market. Other terminology equivalent to fiscal tax on exports: export 
royalty. 
 
Export surtax A tax collected on goods or commodities when they leave a customs territory, 
and which is applied in addition to the normal export tax rate. It can be part of 
a progressive tax system or can be triggered by a price threshold, and so be 
of a temporary nature. Example: a USD 10 surcharge is applied on each ton 
of a commodity exported when the world price of this commodity exceeds 
USD 900/ton. Other terminology equivalent to export surtax: export 
surcharge. 
 
Export quota A prescribed maximum volume of exports. 
 
Export prohibition An absolute restriction on exports, i.e. zero exports. Other terminology 





The requirement to obtain prior approval, in the form of a license, to export a 
good or commodity. There are two types of licensing requirements: (1) Non-
automatic export licensing: Exporters must obtain prior approval, in form of a 
license, to export a good or commodity. This practice requires submission of 
an application or other documentation as a condition for being authorised to 
export. Export licenses are often used in conjunction with export quotas. 
Apart from economic reasons, licensing can be applied for non economic 
reasons: national security, protection of health, safety, the environment, 
morality, religion, intellectual property, or compliance with international 
obligations. Licensing schemes can operate on the basis of product lists, 
such as lists of banned products or of restricted products that require 
licences, or be applied to restrict exports by destination (e.g. specific 
countries), or have other conditions attached, such as that export may be 
used for a specified purpose only. Other terminology equivalent to non-
automatic licensing: export permit. (2) Automatic export licensing: Approval 
for export is granted in all cases, usually immediately upon a standardised 
application. This kind of measure usually only assists in the compilation of 
statistics, does not create burdens or extra transaction costs for exporters 





















A minimum permitted price for a good being exported. This practice is often 
used in conjunction with export taxes because it can facilitate customs 
procedures by preventing under-invoicing, and can be used as a base for 
calculating export taxes. In some cases, minimum export prices are not 
binding but are used as reference prices. Other terminology equivalent to 
minimum export price: administered pricing. 
Dual pricing 
scheme 
The government applies different prices to a product when it is exported than 




Most countries with a VAT system will rebate the VAT on exports. By denying 
VAT reimbursement in whole or part, it is less advantageous to export a 
product than to sell it domestically. This in turn encourages exports of 
products produced locally that use the input to produce downstream products. 
A variant is the removal or reduction of rebate from other sales taxes on 





The government specifies ports/entry points through which export of a good 
or commodity is to be channelled. 
Qualified 
exporters list 
The rights to export a certain commodity are allocated to specific companies 




The requirement for producers of coal and other minerals to allocate a 
proportion of their annual production output to the domestic market. (The term 
“domestic market obligation” appears to be specific to Indonesia, which 
introduced this measure as an integral part of production-sharing contracts to 
ensure that foreign contractors were also held responsible for fulfilling the 
domestic needs of its people.) 
Captive mining When a processing company is required to own the mine that produces its 
inputs, or has been awarded mining rights with the intention that the company 
will mine the commodity for use in its own domestic processes and not trade 
it. Captive mining is a form of government support for firms with access to 
captive supplies, as well as a means of controlling the price and availability of 
a commodity. When captive mining concessions increase (as a share of 
production), exports are likely to fall. 
Other export 
measures 
Measures not elsewhere specified, but which influence de jure or de facto the 
level or direction of exports of goods or commodities. 
 
* Guidance for these definitions of export measures has been provided by the following: OECD (2003), 
p.8; Bonnariva et al. (2009), p.2; Kim (2010), p.6 and 12 ; Goode (1998).  
 
Source: OECD (2014).  
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Appendix B: Countries Using Export Restrictions 
 
 
Country Minerals and Metals Waste and Scrap 




Argentina X X 
Australia 
  Azerbaijan X X 
Belarus X X 
Benin X 
 Bolivia X X 
Brazil X X 
Canada 
  China X X 









 Gabon X 
 Gambia X X 
Ghana X X 
Grenada X 




India X X 

















Republic of Macedonia 
  Malaysia X X 
Mali X 
 Mauritius X X 
Moldova 











Paraguay X X 
Philippines X 
 Russia X X 
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Country Minerals and Metals Waste and Scrap 
Rwanda X X 
Senegal X 
 Sierra Leone X 
 South Africa X X 
Sri Lanka X X 
Syria X 











Turkmenistan X X 
Uganda X X 
Ukraine X X 








Vietnam X X 
Zambia X X 
Zimbabwe X 
 Column Totals 41 45 
 
Note: For industrial materials records relate to the period 2009-2012. 
 
Source: adapted from OECD (2014). 
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Appendix C: A Full List of Independent Variables 
 
Variables Measurement Notes 
Prod 
Country production of a particulare mineral or metal 
as percentage of the world's production Selected in the final model 
Govrev Growth of government revenue in the past two years Selected in the final model 
GDP Growth of total GDP in the past two years Selected in the final model 
Econ 
Economic contribution of a particular mineral or metal 
to overall country GDP Selected in the final model 
FX Change of FX in the past two years Selected in the final model 
Reserve 
Country reserve of a particulare mineral or metal as 
percentage of the world's total reserve Selected in the final model 
Exp 
Country export of a particulare mineral or metal as 
percentage of the world's total export Selected in the final model 
Bud Government budget deficit/ surplus for the past year Selected in the final model 
Struc 
The proportion that downstream industry produciton 
has compared with county total production Selected in the final model 
Unemplo Unemployment rate of the country Selected in the final model 
Smug Level of minerals or metals activities in one country Selected in the final model 
Owner 
The ownership of mining secto: private ownership 
proportion Selected in the final model 
Price 
Change of commodity price for a mineral or metal 
during the past two years Selected in the final model 
RTA 
Number of memberships to any global or reginal 
trade agreements (it is hypothesized that the more 
membership a country has, the less likely it will 
tighten the export restrictions) Tested but not significant 
Water 
Change of renewable water resource per capita 
during the past two years (as a proxy towards 
environment protection; it is hypothesized that the 
worse deterioration, the more likely the export 
restrictions will be tightened) Tested but not significant 
Retarliation Recent trade wars with trading partners Data deficiency 
Habit 
How many times the export policy has been 
tightened during the past five years Data deficiency 
Volatility 
Volatility of  commodity prices during the past five 
years Not considered 
Royalty 
Royalty or other profit tax etc. which replaces the 
function of export taxes to generate government 
revenue Data deficiency 
Stability Stability of government revenue generation Not considered 
Election 
Is the tightening of export restrictions pertaining to a 
potential election? Data deficiency 
 
Appendix D: Correlation Matrix for Thirteen Final Independent Variables 
 
Prod  1.00  
            Econ  0.04   1.00  
           Govrev  0.01  -0.05   1.00  
          GDP  0.05  -0.09   0.90   1.00  
         FX -0.07   0.08   0.47   0.68   1.00  
        Struc -0.15   0.00  -0.14  -0.19  -0.14   1.00  
       Reserve  0.76   0.11  -0.15  -0.09  -0.08  -0.20   1.00  
      Owner -0.26   0.21  -0.24  -0.17   0.09  -0.06  -0.06   1.00  
     Exp  0.67   0.04  -0.12  -0.04  -0.05  -0.19   0.42  -0.05   1.00  
    Smug  0.47  -0.10   0.17   0.11  -0.06   0.09   0.20  -0.30   0.13   1.00  
   Bud -0.27   0.22   0.59   0.36   0.02  -0.12  -0.28   0.03  -0.18  -0.12   1.00  
  Unemplo -0.14   0.09   0.44   0.50   0.62  -0.00  -0.12   0.25  -0.06  -0.20   0.40   1.00  
 Price  0.02   0.18   0.09   0.08   0.02  -0.12  -0.04  -0.08   0.07  -0.05   0.20  -0.02   1.00  
 
Prod Econ Govrev GDP FX Struc Reserve Owner Exp Smug Bud Unemplo Price 
 
Note: High correlation is observed in two pairs: GDP-Govrev and Reserve-Prod.  
A rule of thumb is that for any correlation greater than 0.75,  further investigation over collinearity is merited.  
 
Source: Author’s investigation. 
Appendix E: Data Sources for Each Independent Variable 
 
Variable Data Source 
Prod 
Most of the data comes from British Geological Survey (2009) and British Geological Survey 
(2011; 2013). Chile data in 2009 comes from Geological Survey (2009). US Afganistan data in 
2009 estimated based on US Geological Survey (2009). Belarus data in 2009 estimated based 
on: http://www.guenther-tore.de/articles/a-technical-leader-in-aluminium and 
http://www.alutech-group.com/en/company/history. Morocco data in 2009 estimated based on 
https://www.lightmetalage.com/producers.php. Kenya data in 2009 estimated based on 
http://www.acaciamining.com/~/media/Files/A/Acacia/reports/2011/abg-annual-report.pdf.  
Govrev Most of the data comes from World Bank (2008; 2009; 2010; 2011). Rest from CIA Factbook 
(2008; 2009; 2010; 2011). 
GDP All data comes from World Bank (2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013). 
Econ Most of the data comes from US Geological Survey (2009; 2011). China data in 2011 comes from AWIC report (2014). China data in 2009 estimated based on US Geological Survey 
(2009). Zimbabwe data interpolated based on 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/10/24/recovery-mining-sector-key-long-term-growth/. 
Guyana and Tajikistan data estimated based on UN Comtrade (2009). 
FX All data comes from World Bank (2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013).  
Exp 
All data comes from UN Comtrade (2009; 2011; 2013). China data in 2011 based on 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13465478. China data in 2009 based on 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/215979/major-aluminium-exporters/. South Africa and 
Tajikistan data in 2009 esimated based on US Geological Survey (2009). Phillipines data in 
2009 from http://www.victorynickel.ca/projects/minago/. Rwanda data in 2009 from 




data in 2009 from http://unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcmisc2011d7_en.pdf. Afganistan data in 2009 
estimated base on 
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Trade%20Insights%20No.%206.pdf. Global export of 
platinum, palladium and rare earth in 2009 come from 
http://www.indexmundi.com/en/commodities/minerals/platinum-group_metals/platinum-
group_metals_t5.html, http://www.indexmundi.com/en/commodities/minerals/platinum-
group_metals/platinum-group_metals_t5.html and http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf. 
Bud All data comes from CIA Factbook (2009; 2011; 2013) or respective government websites, 
including statistic bureaus or central banks. 
Unemplo Most of the data comes from World Bank (2009; 2011; 2013). Rest from CIA Factbook (2009; 
2011; 2013). 
Smug 
Most of the data comes from Havscope (2014) at http://www.havocscope.com/country-profile/. 
Rest estimated based on regional shawdow economy percentage from 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/shadow-economies-around-world-model-based-estimates. 
Reserve 
Most of the data comes from US Geological Survey (2009; 2011). Belarus, Kenya and 
Rwanda data in 2009 estimated based on US Geological Survey (2009) on a 10-year mine life 
basis. Pakistan data in 2009 from http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/pakistans-
500bn-gold-mine-kept-under-wraps and http://www.dawn.com/news/1162943. Sri Lanka data 
in 2009 comes from http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=business/lankas-iron-ore-needs-innovation-
regain-past-glory and http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-
details&code_title=46462. Tanzania data in 2009 comes from 
http://thecontinentobserver.com/energy/09/22/tanzania-projected-to-become-leading-iron-
producer-in-africa/ and http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/22/tanzania-china-mining-
idUSL5E7KM1HU20110922. Tunisia data in 2009 comes from 
http://www.onm.nat.tn/en/index.php?p=indminier. Uganda data in 2009 comes from 
http://www.uganda-mining.go.ug/magnoliaPublic/en/GeologyMining.html and 




http://actamont.tuke.sk/pdf/2000/n2/10kusnir.pdf. Argentina data in 2009 comes from 
http://lithiuminvestingnews.com/7418/lithium-in-argentina/. Azerbaijan data in 2009 from 
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http://www.azerbaijan.az/_Geography/_Geostructure/geostructure_02_e.html. Chromite 
reserve in 2011 estimated based on US Geological Survey (2014). For Argentina, Uruguay, 
Ukraine (2011) which we do not have data, we multiply the current country production with the 
avg lifespan of the mine. Argentina bauxite mine lifespan is estimated to be 37 years based on 
http://bauxite.world-aluminium.org/uploads/media/IV_Sustainable_Bx__Mining_Report.pdf. 
http://www.miningaustralia.com.au/features/on-the-road-for-a-massive-new-iron-ore-mine and 
http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/mary-river-iron-ore/ indicate 20+ years of iron ore 





Most of the data comes from British Geological Survey (2009) and British Geological Survey 
(2011; 2013). Rest based or estimated based on Geological Survey (2009; 2011; 2013) and 
UN Comtrade (2009; 2011; 2013). Kenya data in 2009 estimated based on 
http://www.oecd.org/environment/waste/46194971.pdf and 
http://www.ntv.co.ug/news/business/23/feb/2015/kilembe-copper-smelters-accuse-telkom-
kenya-contract-abuse#sthash.2K2g0Cz9.dpbs. Russia data in 2009 esitmated on 
http://www.goldbarsworldwide.com/PDF/RU_NR_Composite.pdf. Tanzania data in 2009 
estimated based on http://www.unitedworld-
usa.com/usatoday/tanzania/18energy_trade_industry.htm and 
http://eonyango.blogspot.ch/2010/04/championing-steel-manufacturing.html. Sri Lanka data in 




Most of the data comes from US Geological Survey (2009; 2011). China data in 2011 comes 
from AWIC report (2014). Pakistan data in 2009 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saindak_Copper_Gold_Project and 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=12964002. China 




Commodity Price for Al, Cu, Fe, Pb, Ni, Sn, Zn from IMF Commodity Price database (2008; 
2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013). Rest based on US market price from US Geological Survey 
(2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013). Lithium price from http://www.lithiumsite.com/market.html. 
 
 
Notes to Methodology of Data Collection 
This section briefly mentions some of the methodologies used in this thesis in estimating data when they 
are not readily available. Independent variables that enjoy sufficient data availability, i.e. directly 
quotable, will not be mentioned below. One caveat to note for the utilization of data is that, for each 
required data, there could be many inconsistent data presented in different databases or documents. It 
is inevitable that there might be some omissions regarding overall data consistency when choosing a 
particular piece of information. Therefore, researchers should bear in mind the potential data sensitivity 
issue with the resulting ERPP model. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 – Majority of the production data comes from British Geological Survey (2014; 2015) or other 
directly quotable resources. Rest data is estimated by identifying the major players in one country for 
that particular mineral or metal, finding the production volume, value or capacity and estimating based 
on these facts. For example, in Afghanistan, the capacity for copper concentrates production is said to 
be 180,000MT per annum according to US Geological Survey (2009), assuming an average 25 percent 
copper content of those concentrates, it results 45,000MT annual production of copper.  
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 – Majority of the data comes from US Geological Survey (2009) in a form of percentage the mining 
and quarrying industry contributes towards a country’s total GDP. In cases of Guyana and Tajikistan, 
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the export value of a particular mineral or metal is used to estimate the contribution. In Zimbabwe’s 
case, interpolation is used based on existing 1999 and 2014 data. 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐  – Majority of the data comes from British Geological Survey (2014; 2015) or other directly 
quotable resources. In cases of Russia and Tajikistan, the smelting capacity of major industry players 
for a particular metal, quoted in US Geological Survey (2009), is used as refined metal production in that 
year. Rest estimated based on UN Comtrade (2009) export data following that, for primary raw 
materials, the minimum production a country has should equal to what it exports. It is, however, not the 
case for refined metal as a country can import raw materials, smelt them and export some. 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 – Calculations are based on the structure of the mining industry section in US Geological Survey 
(2009). Major industry players for each mineral or metal that is significant to a country are listed with 
capacity of production. A typical calculation of government ownership is illustrated with Zambian copper 
industry in Table I below. 
𝑆𝑚𝑢𝑔 – No smuggling data per country per mineral or metal available. Havoscope (2014) black market 
value per country over world’s total black market percentage is used as a proxy. For a handful countries 
that are not covered, the black market value in the country is estimated based on Elgin and Oztunail 
(2012) GDP-weighted shadow economy percentages. 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 – Taken from IMF Commodity Price database for Al, Cu, Fe, Pb, Ni, Sn and Zn. For the rest 
minerals or metals whose international prices are not standardized in major exchanges, the US market 
price for the year is used (US Geological Survey, 2009). 
All data collected is based on the entirety of one of the three possibilities – export restrictions on primary 
mine productions or export restrictions on processed materials or both – for a particular material in a 
particular country. This means, for example, if there is a stricter export policy in one of the many types of 
processed materials in one country, the data with regards to the whole universe23 where the processed 















                                                 
23 If a country tightens copper blister exports, the whole universe of processed copper, including copper 
cathodes, copper mattes and so forth, is considered as being tightened in terms of exports. Therefore 
data is collected accordingly. Although this aggregation reduces the precision per type of product, this 
seems to be a compromise that has to be made due to data availability issue.   
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Table I. Zambian Government Ownership in Copper Industry 
Production Capacity 
per Type of Materials   % Ownership   Cu Content (MT)  
 Ores  
   20,000,000   -     -    
 18,000,000   20.60   5,191.20  
 4,500,000   20.60   1,297.80  
 2,800,000   20.60   807.52  
 2,400,000   20.60   692.16  
 5,500,000   10.00   770.00  
 2,500,000   10.00   350.00  
 1,800,000   -     -    
 800,000   15.00   168.00  
 600,000   15.00   126.00  
 1,200,000   -     -    
 Concentrates  
   50,000   15.00   1,875.00  
 16,000   15.00   600.00  
 Cathodes  
   80,000   20.60   16,315.20  
 180,000   20.60   36,709.20  
 17,000   10.00   1,683.00  
 27,000   10.00   2,673.00  
 52,000   -     -    
 14,000   -     -    
 8,000   -     -    
 Blisters  
   311,000   20.60   56,378.08  
 240,000   20.60   43,507.20  
 200,000   10.00   17,600.00  
 275,000   10.00   24,200.00  
 15,000   10.00   1,320.00  
 150,000   10.00   13,200.00  
 Total Cu Metal 
Content Owned by 
Government  
 
 225,463.36  
 Total Cu Metal 
Content  
 





Source: calculated based on US Geological Survey (2009). 
 




Metals GDP Econ Bud Govrev Prod Exp Struc Owner Unemplo FX Price Smug Reserve Priori Hit 
Afghanistan Copper 1.23 20.00 3.03 1.61 0.36 0.01 0.00 95.24 40.00 1.00 0.74 0.40 0.03 (+) Yes 
Afghanistan Iron & Steel 1.23 20.00 3.03 1.61 0.00 0.08 4.58 100.00 40.00 1.00 1.30 0.40 0.04 (+) Yes 
Argentina Copper 0.93 3.50 0.93 0.93 1.14 0.01 10.06 100.00 7.80 1.18 0.74 0.06 1.46 (+) Yes 
Belarus Aluminum 0.81 3.30 1.03 0.73 0.11 0.05 50.00 0.00 1.60 1.31 0.65 0.98 0.00 (+) Yes 
China Iron & Steel 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 46.48 4.04 39.40 3.44 4.00 0.98 1.30 14.40 4.38 (+) Yes 
China Copper 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 21.38 2.27 71.72 23.80 4.00 0.98 0.74 14.40 5.45 (+) Yes 
China Lead 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 41.46 1.34 78.00 55.07 4.00 0.98 0.82 14.40 13.92 (+) Yes 
China Zinc 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 37.60 0.71 56.32 35.31 4.00 0.98 0.88 14.40 18.33 (+) Yes 
China Tin 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 42.40 1.60 52.31 47.98 4.00 0.98 0.74 14.40 29.75 (+) Yes 
China Rare-earth 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 97.93 97.30 0.00 2.11 4.00 0.98 1.00 14.40 30.68 (+) Yes 
China Tungsten 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 78.22 14.90 5.82 0.00 4.00 0.98 0.82 14.40 60.00 (+) Yes 
China Cobalt 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 6.90 2.40 80.97 23.08 4.00 0.98 0.46 14.40 1.01 (+) Yes 
Guyana Aluminum 1.05 0.03 1.16 1.05 4.00 0.00 0.00 82.50 11.00 1.00 0.65 0.04 2.93 (+) Yes 
India Iron & Steel 1.12 1.91 1.34 1.00 9.59 10.22 22.52 44.77 6.80 1.11 1.30 3.79 2.63 (+) Yes 
Kenya Aluminum 1.03 0.50 1.24 1.02 0.02 0.01 100.00 100.00 40.00 1.12 0.65 0.05 0.00 (+) Yes 
Kenya Copper 1.03 0.50 1.24 1.02 0.02 0.02 66.08 100.00 40.00 1.12 0.74 0.05 1.82 (+) Yes 
Kenya Lead 1.03 0.50 1.24 1.02 0.01 0.02 95.24 100.00 40.00 1.12 0.82 0.05 0.01 (+) Yes 
Morocco Aluminum 1.02 6.00 1.06 0.94 0.03 0.03 69.23 100.00 10.00 1.04 0.65 0.70 0.00 (+) Yes 
Pakistan Copper 0.99 2.90 1.45 1.03 0.14 0.36 47.58 0.00 7.40 1.16 0.74 0.36 2.12 (+) Yes 
Russian Gold 0.74 8.00 0.71 0.56 8.21 0.36 47.27 100.00 6.20 1.28 1.09 2.71 12.77 (+) No 
Russian Palladium 0.74 8.00 0.71 0.56 24.48 14.48 42.38 100.00 6.20 1.28 0.72 2.71 8.73 (+) Yes 
Russian Platinum 0.74 8.00 0.71 0.56 5.28 10.22 46.26 100.00 6.20 1.28 0.75 2.71 8.73 (+) No 
Rwanda Tungsten 1.11 1.00 1.14 1.11 0.95 14.90 0.00 100.00 0.60 1.04 0.82 0.12 1.00 (+) Yes 
Sri Lanka Iron & Steel 1.03 1.50 1.41 1.01 0.01 0.00 41.67 100.00 5.20 1.06 1.30 0.46 0.00 (+) Yes 
Tanzania Cobalt 1.03 2.60 1.10 1.03 0.32 0.30 0.00 100.00 2.50 1.10 0.46 0.46 1.58 (+) Yes 
Tanzania Copper 1.03 2.60 1.10 1.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 100.00 2.50 1.10 0.74 0.46 0.02 (+) Yes 
Tanzania Nickel 1.03 2.60 1.10 1.03 1.09 0.00 0.00 100.00 2.50 1.10 0.69 0.46 2.58 (+) Yes 
Tanzania Iron & Steel 1.03 2.60 1.10 1.03 0.01 0.00 64.38 100.00 2.50 1.10 1.30 0.46 0.75 (+) Yes 
Tunisia Iron & Steel 0.97 1.00 1.14 0.95 0.01 0.02 39.69 46.64 14.00 1.10 1.30 0.94 0.07 (+) Yes 
Uganda Cobalt 1.04 2.02 1.12 0.99 0.98 0.88 50.00 75.00 4.20 1.18 0.46 0.32 0.09 (+) Yes 




Metals GDP Econ Bud Govrev Prod Exp Struc Owner Unemplo FX Price Smug Reserve Priori 
Hit 
 
Uganda Iron & Steel 1.04 2.02 1.12 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.00 100.00 4.20 1.18 1.30 0.32 0.03 (+) Yes 
Vietnam Iron & Steel 1.07 4.40 1.08 1.07 0.08 0.03 58.64 0.00 4.90 1.05 1.30 0.05 0.60 (+) Yes 
Vietnam Titanium 1.07 4.40 1.08 1.07 12.97 0.67 0.00 91.23 4.90 1.05 1.01 0.05 0.11 (+) Yes 
Zimbabwe Chromium 1.85 12.50 1.17 1.85 0.96 0.80 0.00 100.00 80.00 
128.
07 0.90 0.06 0.10 (+) Yes 
China Aluminum 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 34.75 1.05 30.62 52.39 4.00 0.98 0.65 14.40 2.86 (-) No 
China Titanium 1.10 6.03 0.98 1.17 16.67 0.57 6.40 43.14 4.00 0.98 1.01 14.40 14.18 (-) Yes 
India Chromium 1.12 1.91 1.34 1.00 17.04 5.96 9.85 100.00 6.80 1.11 0.90 3.79 11.25 (-) No 
Morocco Lead 1.02 6.00 1.06 0.94 0.22 0.49 36.80 100.00 10.00 1.04 0.82 0.70 0.63 (-) Yes 
Pakistan Iron & Steel 0.99 2.90 1.45 1.03 0.07 0.05 71.41 0.00 7.40 1.16 1.30 0.36 0.19 (-) No 
Russian Nickel 0.74 8.00 0.71 0.56 18.74 1.56 48.31 100.00 6.20 1.28 0.69 2.71 9.43 (-) No 
Russian Tungsten 0.74 8.00 0.71 0.56 8.70 14.66 0.00 100.00 6.20 1.28 0.82 2.71 8.33 (-) Yes 
Sri Lanka Titanium 1.03 1.50 1.41 1.01 1.15 0.47 0.00 0.00 5.20 1.06 1.01 0.46 1.77 (-) No 
Vietnam Aluminum 1.07 4.40 1.08 1.07 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.00 4.90 1.05 0.65 0.05 7.24 (-) Yes 
Vietnam Copper 1.07 4.40 1.08 1.07 0.15 0.08 31.69 0.00 4.90 1.05 0.74 0.05 0.04 (-) Yes 
Vietnam Zinc 1.07 4.40 1.08 1.07 0.24 0.11 30.91 9.09 4.90 1.05 0.88 0.05 1.28 (-) Yes 
Azerbaijan Iron & Steel 0.91 44.80 1.08 0.75 0.01 0.01 83.36 100.00 0.80 0.98 1.30 0.88 0.19 (-) Yes 
Bolivia Antimony 1.04 8.00 0.91 1.04 2.28 0.22 43.90 100.00 7.50 0.97 0.82 0.02 15.00 (-) Yes 
Bolivia Tin 1.04 8.00 0.91 1.04 5.42 6.21 42.91 40.84 7.50 0.97 0.74 0.02 7.00 (-) Yes 
Indonesia Copper 1.06 10.50 1.00 0.83 2.35 1.25 22.91 94.28 8.40 1.07 0.74 1.27 6.55 (-) Yes 
Indonesia Tin 1.06 10.50 1.00 0.83 16.04 30.73 37.71 50.96 8.40 1.07 0.74 1.27 14.00 (-) Yes 
Kazakhstan Copper 0.86 32.30 1.34 0.86 2.93 1.36 44.73 100.00 6.90 1.23 0.74 2.29 3.27 (-) Yes 
Kazakhstan Iron & Steel 0.86 32.30 1.34 0.86 0.18 0.56 8.23 100.00 6.90 1.23 1.30 2.29 2.06 (-) Yes 
Malaysia Tin 0.88 13.00 1.24 0.94 5.98 10.28 93.66 100.00 3.70 1.06 0.74 0.17 8.75 (-) No 
Phillipines Nickel 0.97 2.00 1.05 0.89 10.08 12.79 0.00 100.00 7.40 1.08 0.69 0.95 1.34 (-) No 
South Africa Antimony 1.04 8.80 0.99 0.96 1.60 0.00 12.92 100.00 21.70 1.03 0.82 0.22 2.10 (-) Yes 
South Africa Chromium 1.04 8.80 0.99 0.96 34.15 0.00 0.00 100.00 21.70 1.03 0.90 0.22 41.67 (-) Yes 
Tajikstan Antimony 0.96 12.13 1.02 0.96 3.21 0.19 10.64 100.00 2.30 1.21 0.82 0.10 2.38 (-) Yes 
Zambia Copper 0.86 8.90 1.09 0.74 7.42 3.90 35.71 85.20 50.00 1.35 0.74 0.33 3.45 (-) Yes 
Australia Cobalt 0.88 8.80 0.99 0.81 10.82 7.39 43.02 100.00 5.70 1.08 0.46 0.81 21.13 (-) Yes 
Australia Iron ore 0.88 8.80 0.99 0.81 17.70 37.70 2.36 100.00 5.70 1.08 1.30 0.81 17.50 (-) Yes 
Australia Nickel 0.88 8.80 0.99 0.81 10.98 1.94 44.11 100.00 5.70 1.08 0.69 0.81 37.14 (-) Yes 
Chile Copper 0.96 15.60 0.81 0.74 54.89 21.02 22.01 59.98 10.00 1.07 0.74 0.02 29.09 (-) Yes 
Chile Lithium 0.96 15.60 0.81 0.74 73.62 43.03 0.00 100.00 10.00 1.07 0.99 0.02 73.17 (-) Yes 
Peru Copper 1.00 8.20 0.91 0.90 12.71 12.88 20.34 100.00 9.00 1.03 0.74 0.37 10.91 (-) Yes 




Metals GDP Econ Bud Govrev Prod Exp Struc Owner Unemplo FX Price Smug Reserve Priori Hit 
United 
States Copper 0.98 1.31 1.18 0.89 14.11 11.75 33.61 100.00 9.30 1.00 0.74 34.53 6.36 (-) Yes 
Canada Nickel 0.89 0.60 1.00 0.88 9.29 0.88 46.22 100.00 6.10 1.07 0.69 4.30 7.00 (-) No 
Brazil Iron ore 0.98 2.40 0.90 0.88 16.78 28.66 13.50 100.00 7.40 1.09 1.30 0.94 10.63 (-) Yes 




1) All data are shown in two decimals due to presentation. Data collected from various sources, details see Appendix E. 
2) (+) represents export restriction tightening observations while (-) stands for non-tightening incidents. 
 
Source: Author’s investigation. 
 
Appendix G: Indonesia’s Unexpected Export Tax Scheme  
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014). 
  




Metals GDP Econ Bud Govrev Prod Exp Struc 
Owne
r Unemplo FX Price Smug Reserve Priori Hit 
China Antimony 1.23 6.00 1.11 1.25 82.60 25.37 57.14 30.49 4.30 0.95 1.71 14.40 0.05 (+) Yes 
China Rare-earth 1.23 6.00 1.11 1.25 95.13 97.00 0.00 18.59 4.30 0.95 3.10 14.40 50.00 (+) Yes 
China Tin 1.23 6.00 1.11 1.25 44.00 1.29 54.97 47.98 4.30 0.95 1.28 14.40 31.25 (+) Yes 
India Chromium 1.08 2.63 1.51 0.95 14.20 1.17 2.23 100.00 3.50 1.02 1.28 3.79 10.59 (+) Yes 
Indonesia Nickel 1.15 9.30 1.09 1.40 1.21 5.69 8.00 72.07 6.60 0.96 1.05 1.27 4.88 (+) No 
Indonesia Tin 1.15 9.30 1.09 1.40 15.62 18.43 40.65 28.43 6.60 0.96 1.28 1.27 16.67 (+) Yes 
Ukraine Aluminium 1.20 7.00 1.21 1.43 0.02 0.03 0.44 100.00 7.90 1.00 1.10 0.24 0.00 (+) Yes 
Ukraine Iron 1.20 7.00 1.21 1.43 2.41 6.94 44.32 100.00 7.90 1.00 1.14 0.24 2.63 (+) Yes 
Uruguay Iron 1.21 0.80 1.04 1.20 0.00 0.01 35.06 100.00 6.30 0.96 1.14 0.94 2.03 (+) Yes 
Zambia Copper 1.17 8.80 1.17 1.41 3.87 3.67 40.86 13.24 13.20 1.01 1.17 0.51 2.90 (+) Yes 
Bolivia Antimony 1.22 9.60 1.01 1.01 2.63 3.10 8.61 65.91 2.70 0.99 1.71 0.02 17.22 (-) Yes 
Canada Nickel 1.10 0.70 1.08 1.09 10.49 0.45 39.34 100.00 7.40 0.96 1.05 4.30 4.13 (-) No 
China Cobalt 1.23 6.00 1.11 1.25 4.85 6.71 83.63 23.08 4.30 0.95 0.86 14.40 1.07 (-) Yes 
Kazakhstan Iron 1.27 18.20 1.13 1.15 0.29 1.61 13.16 100.00 5.40 1.00 1.14 3.73 1.25 (-) Yes 
Kazakhstan Copper 1.27 18.20 1.13 1.15 2.85 1.74 47.41 100.00 5.40 1.00 1.17 3.73 1.01 (-) Yes 
Kazakhstan Aluminium 1.27 18.20 1.13 1.15 0.55 0.11 12.98 100.00 5.40 1.00 1.10 3.73 0.55 (-) Yes 
Malaysia Aluminium 1.17 6.30 1.27 1.30 0.06 0.13 0.00 100.00 3.10 0.95 1.10 0.17 0.02 (-) No 
South Africa Chromium 1.11 8.80 1.22 1.12 40.46 0.13 32.26 100.00 24.70 0.97 1.28 0.22 26.67 (-) No 
Russian Copper 1.25 10.70 1.30 1.43 4.64 2.72 47.77 100.00 6.50 0.99 1.17 2.71 4.35 (-) No 
Dominican 
Republic Nickel 1.10 0.40 1.21 1.10 0.74 0.00 50.00 90.00 14.70 1.02 1.05 0.01 1.25 (-) No 
 
Notes:  
1) All data are shown in two decimals due to presentation. Data collected from various sources, details see Appendix E. 
2) (+) represents export restriction tightening observations while (-) stands for non-tightening incidents. 
 
Source: Author’s investigation. 
 
